The title of
this piece is (almost) the same as the earlier one written by a media veteran.
The topic gives away the content. If you haven’t read the original throbbing
piece by J J Omojuwa, here is a link. I
encourage you to do so before you continue with this ADDENDUM.
Apart from
the initial 10 points raised by Omojuwa, here are few more that cannot but
stimulate ones’ objective curiosity about the purpose and intent of the report,
signed by Jim Osayande Obazee, the Executive Secretary/Chief Executive Officer
of the Financial Reporting Council Of Nigeria (FRCN).
My disclaimer,
first and foremost, is as follow:
“While I agree with the 10 points
raised in the original article of Mr J.J. Omojuwa of the same title, none of
the new points discussed in this piece, herein called ADDENDUM, was discussed
verbally, in gestures or writing nor agreed with him before this prose is
documented; and consequently, DO NOT and CANNOT qualify as true addendums to
his original piece (as I do not have such rights) except where he admittedly
states so”
Having read
the report of the FRCN on the “CBN Audited Financial Statements of year ended 31st December
2012”, I must confess, the
umpteenth time, a number of the claims put forward by the Council would not be
verifiable except an investigation by a “truly independent” and professional
body is carried out. In the 13-page report, FRCN does not sound like an “unbiased
investigator”.
If you have (truly) read the report, you “may” observe that the
narration suggests that there was no direct contact or interaction between the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Council as “insinuated” by other reports
and news. This coincides with Mallam Sanusi’s declaration that there was no
time the CBN was contacted or queried by the Council.
However, the report also suggest that there “might” have been a prior
query served to the CBN either by the Presidency or any of its proxies on
certain budgetary, economic and financial matters, to which there were “deficient” responses from the suspended CBN
Governor to the Presidency or the proxy that instituted the “query”. In all,
12th April 2013 was the date the Council received the President’s directive (through
a memo PRES/188/T&I/89) to analyse and interpret the “deficient” responses
of the CBN, through its (now suspended) Governor.
And there brews my initial curiosity.
The following is a reproduction of the first paragraph of the report:
“1. I
respectfully refer to your directive, through memo PRES/188/T&I/89, dated
12th April 2013, the issues raised and the explanation made by the Governor of
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to your office dated May 20th 2013”.
Curiosity 1:
The President had detailed FRCN on issues raised and explanation made by
the CBN Governor one month before Sanusi officially submitted to it. How
possible is that? What exactly was the President’s directive to FRCN? Could it
have been the actions to take on a yet-to-be-received response? What purpose
would such pre-emptively proactive bid serve? Just Curious! There is no way
this paragraph makes complete sense without some interplays. FRCN needs to come
out with some explanatory statements other than this confusing report.
Below is a screenshot of point 2e of the report
The paragraph largely expressed an instance where the CBN (and maybe
Sanusi) had contravened Section 3b of the CBN Act 2007.
The screenshot below shows the Sections 3 & 4 of the CBN Act 2007:
Do you notice anything? That leads to my 2nd curiosity.
Curiosity 2:
How reliable can it be, a report that is burdened with such incongruity?
There
is no Section 3b of the CBN Act 2007 as mentioned in the report. The
entire section 3 of the said act talks strictly and only about the locations of
CBN Headquarters and its branches. What and where is the ES/CEO of the Council
quoting from? Apart from the fact that the report begins to sound like a
“judgement”, how come no one in FRCN and the Presidency detected such anomaly
before the public was served with such “variation”. I wonder what the array of Presidential
Advisers/Spokespersons are paid for. Anyway, someone, somewhere, somehow in the
top echelon of both the FRCN and the Presidency is incompetent and shoddy. This
is not very different from the “Oga at the top” saga.
Curiosity 3:
Between,
May 20th 2013 (the day Sanusi submitted his explanations to the
President) and 7th June 2013 (the date of the FRCN Report) are regular 18 days
(14 workdays). While I do not query the competency and effectiveness of the
Council and its staffers, I am worried about the quality of work that could be produced
in that short period without a prior mind-set in favour or against the input;
especially where financial data of the apex bank for an entire business year
was to be vetted, investigated and verified.
If
pressure, fatigue and mental stress would make the preparer of the report and
all the vetters within the FRCN and the Presidency commit the careless error in Point 2 above, how many
of such errors, misinterpretations, miscalculations and/or deliberate mutations
are likely to be served in that report?
